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Abstract
Consider an estimate of the common value of an auctioned asset that is symmetric in the
bidderstypes. Such an estimate can be represented solely in terms of the order statistics of
those types. This representation forms the basis for a pricing rule yielding truthful bidding
as an equilibrium, whether bidderstypes are a¢ liated or independent. We highlight the link
between the estimator and full surplus extraction, providing a necessary and su¢ cient condition
for ex-post full surplus extraction, including the possibility of independent types. The results
o¤er sharp insights into the strengths and limits of simple auctions by identifying the source of
informational rents in such environments.
Harstad acknowledges hospitable accommodation by the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, and the Olin
School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis, during parts of this research. We are grateful for comments
and suggestions from Richard McLean and Jeroen Swinkels.
1 An Illuminating Example
Insights into the strength of auctions as a selling mechanism can be gleaned from clarity in un-
derstanding when auctions can extract full surplus. Consider the following common-value auction.
Suppose n risk-neutral bidders compete for an indivisible asset worth V , where V has density g(v)
on [0;M ]. For expositional ease consider the case n = 2. Each bidder i = 1; 2 privately observes
his type Xi; let X = (X1; X2). A type Xi may be thought of as a signal representing is private
information about asset value. Assume that the signals Xi are independent conditional on V = v
and that the density of Xijv satises
fi(xijv) = 1[xiv]1[xiM ]hi(xi)ki(v);
where hi and ki are arbitrary positive functions limiting its support to [v;M ]. Clearly this restricts
the functional form of ki to
ki(v) =
1RM
v hi(s)ds
:
In particular, for parameters  = (1; 2) 2 <2++, let
hi(x) = i(M   x)i 1
so that
Fi(xjv) =
R x
v i(M   s)i 1dsRM
v i(M   s)i 1ds
= 1  (M   x)
i
(M   v)i : (1)
Denote the fundamentals of the common-value problem by E = (g; F1; F2). Dene also for each
such environment
v(xi; xj) = E[V jXi = xi; Xj = xj ]: (2)
Lemma 1 For F1; F2 satisfying (1), the estimate of the common value depends only on the mini-
mum of the private signals, i.e. v(xi; xj) = ev(min fxi; xjg):
The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 (Matthews [1977], Milgrom and Weber [1982]) In the environment E = (g; F1; F2) ;
for any  = (1; 2) 2 <2++, a second-price auction, with no reserve price, admits a pure strategy
bidding equilibrium of the form (b; b), where b (x) = v (x; x) :1
1For the cases 1 = 2, this is clearly the unique symmetric equilibrium. This paper uses Bayes-Nash equilibrium
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The combination of these two results yields a situation where the winner of this auction realizes
no surplus ex-post, since both the estimated value and the price he is facing depend solely on his
opponents signal.
Proposition 3 The second-price auction with zero reserve leaves no surplus to the winner in the
environment E for  2 <2++:
Proof. Lemma 1 implies that expected prot conditional on winning,
v(max fX1; X2g ;min fX1; X2g)  v(min fX1; X2g ;min fX1; X2g) = 0;
implying full surplus extraction.
Note that in this case the winner is ex-post indi¤erent between participating in the auction
or not, while the loser pays nothing which also yields indi¤erence over participation.2 This raises
the question of identifying the environments E which allow mechanisms that are, ex-post, both full
surplus extracting and individually rational.3
The interested reader will recognize the similarities between the model above and that employed
by Matthews [1984] in his seminal paper on information acquisition. It considers an environment
E 0 where V has density g(v) on [0;M ], as above. However, for  = (1; 2) 2 <2++, let Fi(xijv) =
(x=v)i , with support [0; v]. This example exhibits v(xi; xj) = ev(max fxi; xjg): In other words, all
of the signals except the highest are uninformative.
Both environments E and E 0 carry the property that Xjv is more accurate (in the sense
of Lehmann [1988] and Persico [2000]) than Xjv for    (demonstrated in the Appendix).4
Persico [2000] (following Matthews [1984] ) used such a model to argue that players have a positive
marginal benet from acquiring better information (which corresponds to choosing a higher i) as
throughout as our solution concept.
2For n > 2, this Proposition applies to an auction where the highest bidder wins, and pays a price equal to the
lowest bid submitted. For n > 2 the second price auction extracts full surplus ex-ante but is not ex-post individually
rational.
3An allocation is ex-post individually rational if each player, upon learning the types of all players, evaluates his
outcome as at least weakly preferable to not participating (following Holmstrom and Myerson [1983]). Clearly the
realization of v will have an impact on the actual prots.
4Lehmanns accuracy order is commonly used in the information acquisition literature (see Jewitt [1997], Persico
[2001] and Parreiras [2002]) as a weakening of the Blackwell su¢ ciency condition. A signal X is more informative than
a signal Y about an unobserved variable V if the variable Xjv can be obtained from Y jv through a transformation
that is increasing in v. Persico [2001] notes that this can be interpreted as X being more correlated than Y with V
and uses this fact to establish a single-crossing condition for decision problems. A su¢ cient condition for X to be
more informative than Y in this order is that F 1X [FY (xjv)jv] is increasing in v.
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long as their opponents are unaware it.5 However, Proposition 3 implies directly that no bidder
would pay any positive price to openly increase the precision of his signal from  to any + "; for
any " > 0. This result points out a fundamental di¤erence between environments E and E 0; due
to the di¤erentiated informational content of various order statistics of the private signals.
The intuition of the result is best captured by the notion that even though a bidders signal
may be more accurate than his rivals signal ex-ante, it might be ex-post uninformative. Lemma
1 shows that expected asset value does not depend on the highest signal regardless of the choice
of (1; 2). Furthermore, conditional on observing all the private information the highest signal
is irrelevant for the purposes of estimating the common value. Hence, the winning bidder can be
precluded from claiming any informational rent, and attains zero expected prot in equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper determines how general this relation is between uninformative-
ness and full surplus extraction. We expand and complete study of full surplus extraction for
common-value auctions in six ways. First, necessary and su¢ cient conditions are obtained here;
the stringency of these straightforward conditions thus places in context the comparatively less
accessible su¢ cient conditions in antecedent papers. Second, su¢ cient conditions allow for a wide
range of statistical relationships across biddersprivate information, again unlike the prior litera-
ture. Third, the mechanism found is a straightforward auction: bidders submit sealed tenders, the
winning bidder pays a price which is a non-stochastic function of the submitted bids, without any
reserve price, and losing bidders pay nothing.6 Fourth, under the conditions enabling full surplus
extraction, an oral ascending auction with public, irrevocable exits (the Japanese variant of the
English auction) implements the auction without a reserve price. Fifth, surplus extraction here sat-
ises ex-post individual rationality: for all realizations of his type and the type(s) of price-setter(s),
upon learning the price he is to pay, the winning bidder is still willing to complete the transaction
(he is indi¤erent).7 Sixth, symmetry plays a narrower role than in antecedent papers.
5Persico [2000] argues in a model containing E as a special case, that information acquisition has a positive
marginal revenue. A player has an incentive to move from  to  + " in his precision as long as his opponent
continues to bid as if the players information precision is constant. In other words if information acquisition happens
in secret the marginal benet of extra-precision is positive.
6Lopomo [2000] points to these conditions as important constraints within which to ask how much surplus a seller
can extract. All prior work on full surplus extraction falls outside his constraints.
7Robert [1991] shows that mechanisms introduced by Crémer and McLean [1985, 1988], McAfee, McMillan and
Reny [1989], and McAfee and Reny [1992] are no longer full-surplus-extracting when either a nite upper bound is
placed on the size of a transfer from a bidder to the auctioneer (i.e., limited liability in the weakest sense imaginable),
or bidders are made innitesimally risk-averse. Our results do not su¤er these particular forms of robustness problems.
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2 A Standard Model
The environment E generalizes the example above as follows. The joint distribution F (V;X) has
the property that (V;Xi) are a¢ liated, for each i = 1; : : : ; n.8 A¢ liation, commonly used in auction
literature, is a strong way to characterize statistical dependence implying that higher values of Xi
are "good news" about the value of V . Denote by Si  R the support of Xi. No symmetry
assumption on the distribution underlying the Xis is made directly, however,
v(x1; :::; xn) := E[V jX1 = x1; :::; Xn = xn]
is required to be symmetric in all arguments (by a¢ liation of (V;Xi), it is non-decreasing).
Let !i : Rn 7! R;for i = 1; :::; n be the set of component-ordering functions. Thus,
!1(x1; :::; xn) = max(x1; :::; xn); ::; !n(x1; :::; xn) = min(x1; :::; xn);
and !2(X) is the second-highest component of the random vector X. Denote ! = (!1; :::; !n). We
will consider direct revelation mechanisms for the allocation of the asset. Player is strategy is a
function bi : Si ! Si which identies a message bi(x) when his type is Xi = x. Let B = (B1; :::Bn)
be the resulting vector of messages. We will focus in particular on mechanisms that allocate
the asset to the player with the highest message, and charge him according to a function p that
depends on the reports only through their order statistics, and thus can be expressed
as p(B) = P (!(B)) for some function P . It is convenient to use notation ! 1 = (!2; :::; !n) so
that ! = (!1; ! 1), with corresponding conventions for x 1 and B 1. We also abuse notation
slightly by using dx 1 in shorthand for certain integrations. The interested reader will recognize
the importance of the a¢ liation assumption which allows us to infer the fact that if the individual
signals Xi are informative about V so are their order statistics.
8A¢ liation follows the standard denition of Milgrom and Weber [1982]. Mathematically, signals X and Y are
a¢ liated if their joint density exhibits total positivity of order 2 or, equivalently, if @
2
@x@y
log f(x; y)  0 whenever
smoothness conditions are satised. A¢ liation is a strengthening of correlation since it implies, among other things,
that conditional on higher values of one variable the other variable increases in the sense of rst order stochastic
dominance. It is obvious from this denition that statistical independence is a limit case of a¢ liation.
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3 A Simple Pricing Rule
Consider the problem of estimating asset value in the hypothetical situation in which all n players
types are observed. Since the expected value of V is a symmetric function of the private signals, it
depends on the types only through their order statistics; hence let H(!(X)) denote an estimator
of asset value.9 That is,
H(!(x1; :::; xn)) = v(x1; :::; xn):
Construct an auction that allocates the good to the highest bidder and uses a pricing rule
P T (B) = H((!2; !2; !3; :::; !n)(B1; B2; :::; Bn)) = H(!2; ! 1(B));
which does not depend on the winners bid and imposes no charges on losing bidders. Thus, this
price would be the estimate of the asset value had the highest bidders type matched the second-
highest bid, and had each other bidder bid his type. Finally, we remark that the auction described
above is a direct mechanism which implements the allocation of the Japanese variant of the English
auction, as described in Milgrom and Weber [1982].
Lemma 4 The pricing rule P T (B) = H (!2; ! 1(B)) generates a direct revelation mechanism,
i.e. in this mechanism, it is an equilibrium for each player i to adopt a strategy bi (x) = x, that is,
to truthfully reveal his type.
Proof. Dene for each y the set A1 (y) = fx 1jmax (x 1)  yg :
Let the other n 1 players adopt b (x) = x, and consider (without loss of generality) the problem
facing player 1 with type X1 = x1:
B 2 argmax
b
Z
A1(b)
(H(! (x1; x 1)) H(!2; ! 1 (b; x 1)) f (x 1jx1) dx 1:
The integrand is positive on A1 (x) and non-positive on A1 (b) nA1 (x) for b  x1, and hence
expected prot is maximized by setting b = x.
It is important to note that the distribution of theXis a¤ects this auction only through its e¤ect
on the estimator H. In particular, truth-telling is an equilibrium regardless of whether the types are
independent or strictly a¢ liated. The intuition for this result is relatively straightforward: if the
9Note that H is an increasing function in all its components given the a¢ liation assumption.
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highest private signal carries no information about the true value of the asset then our mechanism
can elicit truthful revelation of information without leaving money on the table in terms of
informational rents.
The No Residual Uncertainty Class: Consider the environments for which F (V;X)
degenerates to a mass point given realizations X = (x1; :::; xn):10 An immediate implication of this
special case is that the absence of residual uncertainty allows for the introduction of di¤erentiated
risk attitudes. Let each player i seek to maximize the expectation of an increasing utility function
ui of prot, normalized via ui(0) = 0.
Corollary 1 In the No Residual Uncertainty class, for the pricing rule PT (B) = H(!2; ! 1)(B),
it remains an equilibrium for each bidder i to adopt bi(x) = x even if bidders have di¤erentiated
attitudes towards risk.
Proof. The proof above is simply modied to use the integral:
x 2 argmax
b
Z
A1(b)
ui(H(!(x1; x 1)) H(!(b; x 1))f(x 1jx1)dx 1
for which the integrands sign is una¤ected by the introduction of ui.
For the traditional model in which types are independent conditional on V , and stochastically
ordered by V (Wilson [1977] and following papers), the Theorem above holds for risk-neutral
bidders. The presence of residual uncertainty prevents its application to risk-averse bidders.
4 A Su¢ cient Condition for Full Extraction
The success of the motivating example depended on the fact that conditional on observing all
the private information the highest signal is irrelevant for the purposes of estimating the common
value. In our notation this stipulation that the maximum of the n types is uninformative means
that @1H = 0. When this high type is uninformative, removing it from the pricing function does
not bias the price as an estimator of asset value. Hence, we have
Theorem 1 Uninformativeness of the maximum type is su¢ cient for the sealed-bid auction with
pricing rule P T (no reserve price, and no payments from losing players) to be an ex-post full-
surplus-extracting mechanism in the environment E.
10 In other words, V is a nonstochastic function of the types. Several papers have studied average-valuewhere
V = 1
N
(
PN
i=1Xi). In that case P
T (B) = 1
N
(2!2 +
PN
i=3 !i)(B):
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Proof. By Lemma 4, in the truth-telling equilibrium, the winning players expected prot is
H(!(X)) H(!2; ! 1(X)), which is 0, by stipulation, as is that of every losing player.
Corollary 2 In the No Residual Uncertainty class, if the highest type is uninformative, the pric-
ing rule P (B) = H(!2; ! 1)(B), extracts full surplus even in the presence of di¤erentiated risk
attitudes.
Corollary 2 is a simple consequence of Corollary 1.
Multi-Unit Auctions: Briey, consider an extension in which n players with unit demands
compete for k  n homogeneous assets which have a common-value of
V = V (X) = H(!1; ::; !k; !k+1; ::; !n(X)):
A simple extension of Lemma 4 nds truth-telling to be equilibrium bidding when the k highest
players obtain one asset each at a common price
H(!k+1; ::; !k+1; !k+1; ::; !n(B)):
If the rst k order statistics are uninformative, an ex-post full-surplus-extracting mechanism is
attained.
This method of approaching full surplus extraction is simple yet powerful. It relies upon a pricing
rule that yields truthful revelation in equilibrium without regard for the underlying stochastic
relationships across types. By construction it is also ex-post individually rational. The key to
its performance is the exploitation of the fact that the winners information is irrelevant in the
estimation of the common value.
5 Necessity of Uninformativeness
Full surplus extraction is neither the usual nor a predictable occurrence. So it is not surprising that
a su¢ cient condition appears restrictive. Our interest in this condition is bolstered by two charac-
terizations regarding its necessity. In other words, is our su¢ cient condition of uninformativeness
too restrictive? The next theorem shows that as long as the goal is ex-post full surplus extraction,
the answer to the question is no.
Theorem 2 In environment E ex-post full surplus extracting mechanisms exist only if @1H = 0:
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The proof of this result can be found in the appendix. Simply stated, the result indicates that
in these simple environments informativeness and ex-post rents for bidders are equivalent.
Theorem 3 If @1H > 0 and types are independent, no interim full-surplus-extracting mechanism
exists in environment E.
(Proof in Appendix.)11
The intuition for Theorem 3 follows from its simple proof. Full-surplus extraction requires
monotonicity of the allocation probability in types. If the highest signal is informative, then
the seller has to reward the holder of that signal for revealing it via an information rent. The
classical way of reducing this information rent is the introduction of reserve prices which commit
the auctioneer to not selling and therefore prevent full-surplus extraction.12 One should also note
that the monotonicity mentioned above implies a special role for the informational content of the
highest signal. Matthews example where @1H > 0; and @kH = 0 for k > 1 does not allow us
to exploit the uninformativeness of the kth-highest signal in a manner similar to the mechanism
described in Section 3. The key to the results above is the fact that the winners signal needs to
be uninformative. The interested reader will nd it easy to show that increasing the allocation
probability for the kth-highest bidder destroys the incentive compatibility of the mechanism in
general.
It is also instructive to relate the examples in section 1 to the issue of alignment of virtual
valuations with types, which is the theoretical linchpin of several classic auction papers. The
virtual valuation of player i is dened as
Vi = v(xi; x i)  1  F (xijx i)
f(xijx i) @iv(xi; x i):
It is a dictum of auction theory that expected revenue is increasing in the probability that the asset
is sold to the player with the highest virtual valuation.13 When @1H = 0, as in the original example,
11 It is noteworthy that statistical independence of playerstypes and ex-post individual rationality of the mechanism
play the unexpected role of substitutes as elements of necessary conditions.
12See Myerson [1981], Bulow and Klemperer (1996). The sort of lotteries employed in Crémer and McLean (1988)
are unavailable in the independent case.
13Myerson [1981] rst denes virtual valuations, for the independent-types case, and establishes this result when
dependence of valuations on rivalstypes is limited to additive revision e¤ects.Bulow and Klemperer [1996] dene
virtual valuations, calling them marginal revenues,for general auction forms. They assume what they call regularity,
by which they mean that higher types have higher virtual valuations. Campbell and Levin [2005] cite the dictum
without claiming credit for it, apparently treating the demonstration in Bulow and Klemperer [1996] as not depending
on the regularity assumption made there. Campbell and Levin discuss methods of decreasing the probability that
the highest type attains the asset, for the case when the highest type does not have the highest virtual valuation.
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no rival has a higher virtual valuation than the bidder with the highest type. If, further, @iH >
0; 8i 6= 1, then the highest type is uniquely the type with the highest virtual valuation. These
are the cases where auctions work well, and the simple auction presented here exceptionally well.
In the Matthews example, the highest type has the lowest virtual valuation. Hence, instruments
that are working to reduce the probability that the highest type wins, can potentially increase the
expected revenue of the seller.
An interesting example that follows from this theorem is that if the private signals are indepen-
dent and the common value is the average, full surplus cannot be extracted. It is striking that the
seemingly small change to having the common value equal the median allows any standard auction
format to extract full surplus.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides a simple yet sharp insight into the optimality of auction mechanisms. For
a subset of allocation problems, identied via the condition @1H = 0 above, simple auctions can
extract surplus fully and robustly. In particular, they are robust to the stochastic structure of
bidders private information (a¢ liation and uninformativeness of the highest order statistic are
all that is required), and for a further subset, robust to changes in bidders risk attitudes. The
uninformativeness condition allows the auctioneer to achieve the desired result even in environments
of independent private information. The mechanisms which achieve this are ex-post individually
rational and implementable by simple auctions.
Of course, the set of problems for which estimators based only on the (n   1)-lowest order
statistics can be constructed is small. This is a direct consequence of the stringency of the ex-
post zero surplus requirement. However, any environment with @1H > 0 imposes a cost on the
auction designer: either a mechanism [i] must depend in a much more complex way upon detailed
information about the distribution of types, or it [ii] must move away from selling to the highest type
with probability one. Choice [i] is reected in the antecedent full-surplus-extracting mechanisms
of Crémer and McLean [1985, 1988], McAfee, McMillan and Reny [1989], and McAfee and Reny
[1992]; all approach the problem from an interim perspective. Their mechanisms di¤er from ours
in complexity and in dependence on risk neutrality, unlimited liability, and particular details of the
information structure.
Choice [ii] is characteristic of the literature on optimal auctions when some surplus remains with
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the bidders. Myerson [1981] sells to the bidder with the highest virtual valuation, and then only if
a reserve price is met (Riley and Samuelson [1981] and Harris and Raviv [1981] nd corresponding,
less general characterizations). A host of papers depend upon a reserve price, with perhaps the
most accessible being Bulow and Roberts [1989]. Harstad and Bordley [1996] sell a single asset to
a randomly chosen bidder among the k highest. Bulow and Klemperer [1996] use the (n  1) losing
bids to formulate a take-it-or-leave-it-o¤er (which di¤ers from a reserve price only in how late in the
auction it is announced) to the high bidder. Campbell and Levin [2005] consider a specialization
of the Matthews example with independent types, and nd that posted prices may generate more
revenue than a simple auction. For situations so far from the condition found above to be critical,
no auction will be a very satisfactory mechanism.
7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: By Bayesrule,
v(xi; xj) =
RM
0 vg(v)
Q
i=1;2 1[xiv]1[xiM ]hi(xi)gi(v)dvRM
0 g(v)
Q
i=1;2 1[xiv]1[xiM ]hi(xi)gi(v)dv
:
Note that
Q
i=1;2 1[xiv] = 1[min(xj ;xi)v], so cancelling all common terms which depend only on xi
and xj in numerator and denominator yields
v(xi; xj) =
RM
0 vg(v)1[min(xj ;xi)v]
Q
i=1;2 gi(v)dvRM
0 g(v)1[min(xj ;xi)v]
Q
i=1;2 gi(v)dv
:
That both numerator and denominator depend only on minfxi; xjg yields the conclusion.
Claim 1 In the environment E, Xjv is more accurate (in the sense of Lehmann [1988] and
Persico [2000]) than X jv for  > .
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that
F
 1
[F  [xjv]jv] is increasing in v, for x 2 (v;M) :
Note that
F
 1
[xjv] =M   (M   v)(1  x) 1 ;
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so that
F
 1
[F [xjv]jv] =M   (M   v) (x  v)


(M   v) 
:
Let  =  < 1, then
d
dv
F
 1
[F [xjv]jv] = d
dv

  (M   x)

(M   v) 1

> 0;
by direct calculation.
Proof of Theorem 2: Consider, as in Myerson [1981], the class of mechanisms consisting of
a pair of functions (; y) = f(i; yi); i = 1; :::; ng that dene, respectively, the probability of player
i receiving the asset and is payment, as a function of the prole of reported types. The ex-post
individual rationality condition (IR) for a mechanism (; y) to extract full-surplus is
i(xi; x i)v(xi; x i)  yi(xi; x i) = 0:
for all (xi; x i) :
The incentive compatibility condition (IC) is
Z
X i
(i(xi; x i)v(xi; x i)  yi(xi; x i))f(x ijxi)dx i  0
for all xi and xi: The (IR) condition for xi can be written
i(xi; x i)v(xi; x i) = yi(xi; x i);
for all x i. The (IC) condition therefore becomesZ
X i
i(xi; x i)(v(xi; x i)  v(xi; x i))f(x ijxi)dx i  0
for all xi and xi: So whenever xi  xi, the monotonicity of v rules out the possibility of a strictly
negative integrand:
i(xi; x i)(v(xi; x i)  v(xi; x i)) = 0;
for all x i. Note that the monotonicity of v(:; :) also implies, for all x i:
i(xi; x i)(v(xi; x i)  v(xi; x i))  0:
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Combining the last two inequalities:
(i(xi; x i)  i(xi; x i))(v(xi; x i)  v(xi; x i))  0;
for all xi  xi: That is, the mechanisms allocation probability function  must satisfy monotonicity.
This relationship holds for all i. Full surplus extraction and symmetry guarantee that xing an
arbitrary x i, there must exist a value of xi such that i(xi; x i) > 0: Monotonicity of  then
implies that i(xi; x i) > 0, for all xi  xi. In particular, choose exi = max fxi; x ig ; which ensures
that i(exi; x i) > 0: Then v(xi; x i) = v(exi; x i) for all xi  exi:
As x i was arbitrary, this establishes that a necessary condition for ex-post full surplus extrac-
tion is @1H = 0:
Proof of Theorem 3: Proof is by contradiction. Using the same notation as above, let
Z(bxi; xi) represent player is expected payo¤ under a mechanism (; y) if he reports bxi and his type
is xi:
Z(bxi; xi) = Z (i(bxi; x i)v(xi; x i)  yi(bxi; x i))f(x i)dx i:
A mechanism must satisfy the classic conditions
(IR) Z(xi; xi)  0; for all xi; and
(IC) Z(xi; xi)  Z(bxi; xi); for all bxi; xi:
Full surplus extraction (FS) requires that the (IR) constraint be satised with equality, and the
asset to be sold with probability 1 whenever its value is positive. Since the asset must be sold, it
must be possible to x an i, some (xi; x i) so that i(xi; x i) > 0 over some set of positive measure
in the x i space, and consider any bxi > xi. Using (FS) and (IC):
0 = Z(bxi; bxi) = Z(xi; xi)  Z(xi; bxi):
This inequality can be rewritten as
Z
i(xi; x i)(v(bxi; x i)  v(xi; x i))f(x i)dt i  0:
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A contradiction to @1H > 0 has been reached: @1H > 0 implies that the di¤erence above,
v(bxi; x i)  v(xi; x i), is everywhere positive, and by construction is being multiplied by a positive
probability over some positive measure set.
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